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Reciprocal representation
in a world's assembly...

Chicago


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Reciprocal Representation in a World's Assembly

— and —

International Bonding

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Box 67

Remedies against Recurrence of War

By Emil G. Beck, M. D.

CHICAGO, ILL.

The essential points:

- A. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY
WITH JUDICIAL POWERS
(Chosen by Reciprocal Method)

Each nation to send at least seven Representatives, but instead of choosing all from among its own citizens, two of these representatives to be selected from its own country and one from each of the other countries. This RECIPROCAL method of choosing Representatives will create an extraordinary assemblage of Statesmen, who will constitute an impartial WORLD PARLIAMENT, not likely to form cliques.

- B. All nations to enter into a

UNIVERSAL ALLIANCE TREATY (Bond)

which provides for violation of its terms by the forfeiture of heavy bonds furnished by the co-signers (*bonds not their own issue*).

- C. A suggestion for the formation and economical upkeep of an

INTERNATIONAL ARMY (RECIPROCAL)

which in peace times serves as a National Police part time in foreign countries.

2 Mand, 1920 - C.R.W.

RECIPROCAL REPRESENTATION IN A WORLD'S
ASSEMBLY
and
INTERNATIONAL BONDING
REMEDIES AGAINST RECURRENCE OF WAR

By Emil G. Beck, M. D.
Chicago

In his epoch making address of January 22, 1917, President Wilson said: "In every discussion of the peace that must end this war, it is taken for granted that the peace must be given by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted."

This declaration, no doubt, voices the most intense desire of every well-meaning person. The representatives of the allied countries, the world's greatest statesmen, have now met to elaborate plans by which this lofty ideal of the President may be realized. They are confronted with most complex problems but unquestionably the most momentous and

the one uppermost in their minds, is the problem of devising a plan which will guarantee a durable peace to the world.

Suggestions from political economists and statesmen have appeared in periodicals from time to time, and the reports from the daily press indicate that the delegates to the peace meeting have come to an understanding of the principles which shall form the basis of a durable peace, but to my knowledge *thus far no definite and workable plan has been made public.*

A League of Nations, although opposed by some, at present seems the most promising of the plans as yet proposed.

The main barrier to a lasting peace is the unfortunate circumstance that nations do not trust one another sufficiently to allow all matters of dispute to be adjusted by a Court of Arbitration. Nations are not willing to submit vital issues for arbitration to a body of judges delegated by the different nations, unless they are convinced that in the hands of these judges their interests are safeguarded to at least the same degree as they would be by force of arms. They fear that men with the highest ideal and respect for the rights of others, with the strongest desire to be impartial, would, when the fate of their country is threatened, unconsciously sway to the side of their native land. A Frenchman will remain a Frenchman, a German will remain a German, and a citizen

of the United States will always remain a true American, when his own country is in danger. Quoting Prof. Adler:

"The judges you secure may be upright men, but the bias in the blood will tell. We had this exemplified among ourselves in the case of the Hayes-Tilden Commission. The country was on the verge of civil war. It was finally decided to pass the matter in dispute over to fifteen jurists, the best in the country. No one doubted their uprightness nor their disposition to be fair, but every time they voted on a material question the Commission stood eight to seven—eight Republicans to seven Democrats. And the impartial historian says that it was the bias of party which in this crucial instance, though they were not conscious of it, gave direction to the legal mind."

It will indeed be very difficult to secure a Court of Arbitration which will be regarded by all nations as absolutely impartial, a Court so constituted as to provide against possible formation of cliques among its members, who in deciding vital issues might cast their votes for the country which they favor or to which they owe allegiance. It is thus evident that before a League of Nations or any other form of affiliation of nations can succeed, this one obstacle must be eliminated. To overcome this vital objection, I submit the following suggestion:

As a basis for working out a plan I have applied two fundamental principles, namely:

THAT RECIPROCITY IS THE MOST POTENT
FACTOR IN RETAINING THE FRIENDSHIP OF A
NEIGHBOR.

THAT A BOND IS STRONGER THAN A PROMISE.

The first principle is applied in the selection of the members of

AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY
WITH JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE POWERS
(CHOSEN RECIPROCALLY).

The second in

THE SIGNING OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY
AGAINST WARS AND SECURED BY HEAVY BOND-
ING, EACH NATION TO FURNISH FOREIGN
BONDS.

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY WITH JUDICIAL POWER (RECIPROCAL)

Instead of each nation selecting its Representative from among its own citizens, *each should choose two from its own and five or more additional representatives from other nations*, but no more than one from any one foreign country. Thus, all nations would have an opportunity of choosing men

well known to them, in whose integrity and honesty they have the fullest confidence and to whom they would unhesitatingly submit matters of international dispute. In England the members of Parliament are not always chosen from the counties and boroughs in which they live. Why can not the same principle be used internationally?

By this system of choosing representatives, the danger of partiality to one's own country would materially diminish. Each representative would consider it a point of honor to deal fairly with the country which placed implicit confidence in him. As a matter of self-interest he would act impartially, because his own country is in turn dependent upon the honesty and fairness of the foreign representatives it selects. Such *interlocking representation would blend the interests of all nations* and the personal contact of the representatives would inevitably result in friendly relationship among nations. Reciprocity of delegates would thus create the strongest link possible between the powers, each realizing that it is to their mutual interest to treat one another with fairness and justice.

(A very valuable suggestion was offered to me by one of the United States Senators to whom I submitted this problem; namely, that this Assembly would necessarily have legislative power as well as judicial, since they could not decide international disputes unless they had international laws and rules as a basis for their discussions. He states: "It is apparent, therefore, that the first step is a great international legislature, rather than an international court—a legislature that shall determine and agree upon fundamental international rights which in themselves will include fundamental international duties of the countries towards each other. Having determined just what these rights are, having by the very instrument itself, pledged all to protect the rights of each, then, and then only, can we provide for a great international court which must be guided by those fundamental rights and corresponding duties. Nations are free. Nations must agree together just to what extent the freedom of each may be curtailed. Having entered into that agreement there will be little difficulty in providing for an international court to decide all of the minor questions of differences under the guidance of this supreme international law.")

The nations joining this international brotherhood would no more surrender any part of their sovereignty than the original thirteen colonies surrendered their State rights when they formed the United States.

The members of this international assembly might select from their midst a smaller number to form an INTERNATIONAL SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, to whose final decision any dispute would be referred should it fail to obtain satisfactory settlement by the International Court of Justice.

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE TREATY

When the nations meet to adjust their differences ONE question will stand out prominently, namely: What measures shall be taken to compel a nation to live up to its treaties? NEW TREATIES will have to be entered into, and here difficulties will arise. At present, treaties are not regarded with the same sacredness, confidence, and respect by the powers as they were before this war. We have striking examples to prove this fact. The Allies will be reluctant to sign new treaties unless absolute assurance is given that some power even greater than the sword will compel the co-signers to live up to their agreements. They will demand a positive guarantee that the signing of the papers is not a mere formality and that the treaty will not become a mere scrap of paper when its terms conflict with the interests of one of the co-signers. What satisfactory guarantee could

be given? To this question I desire to make the following answer:

Let the nations enter into a treaty which embodies practically a code of international laws to be worked out by the International Assembly; this code binding the nations to its observance by demanding a substantial bond of the signers.

The objection may be raised that should a real emergency arise a nation might repudiate its bond. This objection may be met by providing that the *bonds furnished shall not be paper of its own issue but securities of other countries*, thus making their repudiation practically impossible.

To illustrate the latter proposition: Germany, for instance, would deposit securities purchased from other countries: the amounts purchased from each country to be so proportioned as to furnish a certain percentage of securities of as many countries as possible, for instance:

10% of French Bonds	}	Government or Industrial
10% of English Bonds		
10% of U. S. Bonds		
5% of Swiss Bonds		
5% of Argentine Bonds		
60% of other countries		

England, Russia, United States, and all other countries entering the Alliance to do likewise. The aggregate value of deposit by each nation must be so large as to make it prohibitive for that nation to forfeit it.

The bonds shall be placed in the hands of an INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF TRUSTEES, chosen by all the countries which enter into this international agreement.

A serious violation of the International Alliance Treaty by a nation would constitute sufficient cause for the forfeiture of its bond. What should be done with the forfeited bonds is a question which could easily be decided by those elaborating the plan. It could either be used for current expenses of the International Assembly; for paying indemnities to any nation which has been unjustly attacked or injured; or for other purposes.

Special treaties between individual nations need not be secured by any additional bonds, because all questions of dispute would be settled by an International Assembly and its decision made binding.

Judging from the opinions of statesmen and professors of international law to whom a previous copy of this paper has been submitted, I am confident that AN INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY chosen by the RECIPROCAL method and a diplomatically drawn up JOINT TREATY OF ALL NATIONS (with the additional safeguard of a heavy BOND against its violation) would be a sure step towards the realization of a lasting peace.

AN INTERNATIONAL RECIPROCITY ARMY

We must, however, bear in mind that in the present turmoil it would be inexpedient to make a very radical reduction in the naval or military strength of the world. Radical changes must not be made suddenly; improvement must take place by a slow process. For this reason, it will be necessary for the present, for each country to maintain a certain military and naval force until there is a readjustment of present international affairs. Time will change conditions; the relations among nations will again become fraternal, but until such time we must retain a weapon aside from these agreements. A more potent restraint must be kept as a safeguard in order to check an ambitious belligerent who might suddenly break all rules and promises should he become involved in a controversy which he believes is not adjudicable.

If, then, for the present, it is absolutely necessary to retain a certain amount of force as a safeguard could we suggest some practical and economical upkeep of an INTERNATIONAL ARMY?

If the nations were assured that they could count upon each other for their combined but small forces against an aggressor, it would be entirely superfluous for each of them to maintain a large military organization. On the other hand, if each nation must individually protect its own rights

and interests, each would be obliged to maintain an army so large that at any time it might be pitted against a combination of other powers who are equally prepared. This stupendous competition for preparedness has in the past absorbed a large part of the energy and the savings of the human race. Why can not the powers combine their forces and keep them in readiness for an emergency? A small force allotted to each nation in its proper proportion would be just as effective as a large force on each side, and it would be vastly more economical. I would, therefore, suggest a plan most economical and at the same time sufficiently effective to check any attempt on the part of any nation to create war:

A. Each nation to have a standing army of well-trained, well-paid soldiers, not larger than is actually necessary to protect itself against internal disturbances.

B. The size of this army should be in proportion to the population.

C. The armies of all countries should have a combined general staff, so that the armies may be trained on the same principles of warfare and should be so organized that on the shortest notice a call would bring together a force large enough to check unjust aggression.

D. *Finally*, a number of regiments of the army of one country should be stationed in different sections of foreign

countries for a stated period. For illustration—an American soldier would serve one year at home, six months in France and six months in Germany, and the French or German soldier would have a like experience. This would give all armies an equal chance to perfect themselves in military training and become acquainted with the military tactics of allied countries. At the same time, the military force of all countries would become familiar with the terrain of the various countries, which in case of a sudden outbreak of war, would be of great advantage to the combined powers in checking the aggressor.

Such military education might create a friendly spirit among the different armies. It would work out in a manner similar to that of the reciprocal representation of jurists of all countries. Aside from policing the country in peace times, the armies could be of service in many ways as teaching citizenship to immigrants and maintaining a merchant marine.

This plan is not intended to replace other plans, such as the League of Nations. It merely offers some suggestions, based upon fundamental principles, which may be incorporated into the plans already under consideration.

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